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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a logical system in which various group-level epistemic actions are incorporated into the
object language. That is, we consider the standard modeling of knowledge among a set of agents by multi-
modal Kripke structures. One might want to consider actions that take place, such as announcements to groups
privately, announcements with suspicious outsiders, etc. In our system, such actions correspond to additional
modalities in the object language. That is, we do not add machinery on top of models (as in Fagin et al [4]),
but we reify aspects of the machinery in the logical language.
Special cases of our logic have been considered in Plaza [13], Gerbrandy [5, 6], and Gerbrandy and Groene-
veld [7]. The latter group of papers introduce a language in which one can faithfully represent all of the
reasoning in examples such as the Muddy Children scenario. In that paper we nd operators for updating
worlds via announcements to groups of agents who are isolated from all others. We advance this by considering
many more actions, and by using a more general semantics.
Our logic contains the innitary operators used in the standard modeling of common knowledge. We present
a sound and complete logical system for the logic, and we study its expressive power.
1991 Mathematics Subject Classication: 03B45, 68T27, 68T30
1991 ACM Computing Classication System: F.4.1, I.2.4, I.2.11
Keywords and Phrases: epistemic actions, epistemic logic, knowledge update, public announcements
Note: We thank Jelle Gerbrandy and Rohit Parikh for useful conversations on this work. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at the 1998 Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge.
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1. Introduction: Example Scenarios and Their Representations
We introduce the issues in this paper by presenting a few epistemic scenarios. These are all based
on the Muddy Children scenario, well-known from the literature on knowledge. The intention is to
expose the problems that we wish to address. These problems are rst of all to get models which are
faithful to our intuitions, and then to build and study logical systems which capture some of what is
going on in the scenarios.
The cast of characters consists of three children: A, B, and C. So that we can use pronouns for
them in the sequel, we assume that A is male, and B and C are female. Furthermore, A and B are
dirty, and C is clean. Each of the children can see all and only the others. It is known to all (say, as
a result of a shout from one of the parents) that at least one child is dirty. Furthermore, each child
must try to gure out his or her state only by stating \I know whether I’m dirty or not" or \I don’t
know whether I’m dirty or not." They must tell the truth, and they are perfect reasoners in the sense
that they know all of the semantic consequences of their knowledge. The opening situation and these
rules are all assumed to be common knowledge.
Scenario 1. After reflection, A and B announce to everyone that at that point they do not
know whether they are dirty or not. (The reason we are having A and B make this announcement
rather than all three children is that it ts in better with our scenarios to follow.) Let  denote this
announcement.
As in the classical Muddy Children, there are intuitions about knowledge before and after . Here
are some of those intuitions. Before , nobody should know that he or she is dirty. However, A should
think that it is possible that B knows. (For if A were clean, B would infer that she must the dirty
one.) After , A and B should each know that they are dirty, and hence they know whether they are
dirty or not. On the other hand, C should not know whether she is dirty or not.
Scenario 1.5. This scenario begins after . At this point, A and B announce to all three that
they do know whether or not they are dirty. We’ll call this event 0. Our intuition is that after 0, C
should know that she is not dirty. Moreover, A and B should know that C knows this. Actually, the
dirty-or-not states of all the children should be common knowledge to all three.
Scenario 2. As an alternative to the rst scenario, let’s assume that C falls asleep for a minute.
During this time, A and B got together and told each other that they didn’t know whether they were
dirty or not. Let  denote this event. After , C wakes up. Part of what we mean by  is that C
does not even consider it possible that  occurred, and that it’s common knowledge to A and B that
this is the case. Then our intuitions are that after , C should \know" (actually: believe) that A does
not know whether he is dirty (and similarly for B); and this fact about C is common knowledge for
all three children. Of course, it should also be common knowledge to A and B that they are dirty.
Scenario 2.5. Following Scenario 2, we again have 0: A and B announce that they do know
whether they are dirty or not. Our intuitions are not entirely clear at this point. Surely C should
suspect some kind of cheating or miscalculation on the part of the others. However, we will not have
much to say about the workings of this kind of real-world sensibility. Our goal will be more in the
direction of modeling dierent alternatives.
Scenario 3. Now we vary Scenario 2. C merely feigned sleep and thought she heard both A and
B whispering. C cannot be sure of this, however, and also entertains the possibility that nothing was
communicated. (In reality, A and B did communicate.) A and B for their part, still believe that C
was sleeping. We call this event γ.
4One might at rst glance think that A and B’s \knowledge" of C’s epistemic state is unchanged
by γ. After all, the communication was not about C. However, we work with a semantic notion of
knowledge, and after γ, A and B know that they are dirty, hence then know that C knows that they
are dirty. A and B did not know this at the outset.
So we need to revise the initial intuition. What is correct is that if C knows some fact ’ before γ,
then after γ, A and B know (or rather, believe) that C knows ’. This is because after γ, A and B not
only know the clean-or-dirty state of everyone, they (therefore) also know exactly which possibilities
everyone is aware of, which they discard as impossible, etc. So each of them can reconstruct C’s entire
epistemic state. They believe that their reconstruction is current, but of course, what they reconstruct
is C’s original one, before γ.
Conversely, if after γ, A and B \know" that C knows ’, then before γ, C really did know ’. That
is, the reconstruction is accurate. For example, after γ, A believes that C should not consider it
possible that A knows that he is dirty. However, C thinks it is possible that A knows he is dirty.
There is a stronger statement that is true: C knows ’ before γ i after γ, it is common knowledge
to A and B that each of them knows that C knows ’. Intuitively, this hold because each of A and B
knows that both of them are able to carry out the reconstruction of C’s state.
Our nal intuition is that after γ, C should know that if A were to subsequently announce that he
knows that he is dirty, then C would know that B knows that she is dirty.
Scenario 3.5. Again, continue Scenario 3 by 0. At this point, C should know that her suspicions
were conrmed, and hence that she is not dirty. For their part, A and B should think that C is
confused by 0: they should think that C is as she was following Scenario 2.5.
Scenario 4. A and B are on one side of the table and C is on the other, dozing. C wakes up at
what looks to her like the middle of a joint confession by A and B. The two sides stare each other
down. In fact, A and B have already communicated. We call this action . So C suspects that  is
what happened, but can’t tell if it was  or nothing. For their part, A and B see that C suspects but
does not know that  happened.
The basic intuition is that after , it should be common knowledge to all three that C suspects that
the communication happened. Even if C thinks that A and B did not communicate, C should not
think that she is sure of this.
One related intuition is that after , it should be common knowledge that C suspects that A knows
that he is dirty. As it happens, this intuition is wrong. Here is a detailed analysis: C thinks it possible
that everyone is dirty at the outset, and if this were the case then the announcement of B’s ignorance
would not help A to learn that he is dirty; from A’s point of view, he still could be clean and B would
not know that she is dirty. C’s view on this does not change as a result of , so afterwards, C still
thinks that it could be the case that A says, \It’s possible that B and C are the dirty one and I am
clean, Hence C would see my clean face and not suspect that I know that I am dirty." So it certainly
should not be common knowledge that C suspects that A knows he is dirty.
Notice also that C would say after : \I think it is possible that no announcement occurred, and
yet A thinks it possible that B is the only dirty one. In that case, what A would think that I suspect
that A told B that he knows that he is not dirty. Of course, this is not what I actually suspect."
The point is that C’s reasoning about A and B’s reasoning about her involves suspicion of a dierent
announcement than we at rst considered.
Scenario 4.5. Once again, we continue with 0. Our intuition is that this is tantamount to an
admission of private communication by A and B. If we disregard this and only look at higher order
knowledge concerning who is and is not dirty, we expect that the epistemic state after 0 is the same
for all three children as it is at the end of Scenario 1.5.
1. Introduction: Example Scenarios and Their Representations 5
1.1 Models
Now that we have detailed a few scenarios and our intuitions about them, it is time to construct some
Kripke models as representations for them.
The Models U and V . We begin with a representation of the situation before . We take the Kripke
model U whose worlds are u1; : : : ; u7 and whose structure is given in the table on the left below:
World A B C !A !B !C
u1  u1; u5 u1; u3 u1
u2  u2; u6 u2 u2; u3
u3   u3; u7 u1; u3 u2; u3
u4  u4 u4; u6 u4; u5
u5   u1; u5 u5; u7 u4; u5
u6
p   u2; u6 u4; u6 u6; u7
u7    u3; u7 u5; u7 u6; u7
World A B C !A !B !C
v1  v1; v5 v1; v3 v1
v3   v3; v7 v1; v3 v3
v5   v1; v5 v5; v7 v5
v6
p   v6 v6 v6; v7
v7    v3; v7 v5; v7 v6; v7
For example, in world u3, A is clean, but B and C are dirty. Also, the worlds which A thinks are
possible are u3 and u7. That is, A sees that B and C are dirty, so A infers that the world is either
u3 or u7. The rest of the structure is explained similarly, except for the
p
mark next to u6. This
species u6 as the actual world in the model, the one which corresponds to our description of the
model before . Note that U incorporates some of the conventions stated in Scenario 1. For example,
in each world, each child has a complete and correct assessment of which worlds are possible for all
three reasoners.
Each of our intuitions about knowledge before  turns into a statement in the modal logic of
knowledge. This logic has atomic sentences DA, DB, and DC standing for \A is dirty", etc.; it has
knowledge operators 2A, 2B, and 2C along with the usual boolean connectives. We are going to use
the standard Kripke semantics for multi-modal logic throughout this paper. So given a model-world
pair, say hA; ai, and some agent, say D, we’ll write
hK; ki j= 2D’ i whenever k!D l in K, we have hK; li j= ’.
The boolean connectives will be interpreted classically. We can then check the following:
hU; u6i j= :2ADA ^ :2A:DA ^ :2BDB ^ :2B:DB ^ :2CDC ^ :2C:DC
hU; u6i j= 3A2BDB
The model after  is the Kripke model V , shown on the right above. The way we got V from U was
to discard the worlds u2 and u4 of U , since in U at each of those worlds, either A or B would know if
they were dirty. We also changed the u’s to v’s to avoid confusion, and to stress the fact that we get
a new model. Turning back to our intuitions, we can see that the following holds:
hV; v6i j= 2ADA ^2BDB ^ :(2CDC _2:DC)
The Model W . Scenario 1.5 elaborates Scenario 1 by the event 0. So we discard the worlds where
this is false in V , and we obtain a one-world model W :
World A B C !A !B !C
w6
p   w6 w6 w6
(We have renamed v6 to w6.) This model reflects our intuition that at this point, C should know that
she is not dirty.
6The Model X . This corresponds to Scenario 2. We start with U and see the eect of the private
announcement . The resulting model X is:
World A B C !A !B !C
u1; : : : ; u7
x1  x1; x5 x1; x3 u1
x3   x3; x7 x1; x3 u2; u3
x5   x1; x5 x5; x7 u4; u5
x6
p   x6 x6 u6; u7
x7    x3; x7 x5; x7 u6; u7
Notice that the worlds u1; : : : ; u7 are also worlds in X . We did not put any information in the chart
above for those worlds since it should be exactly the same as in U above. The reason for having these
\old worlds" in X is that since C was asleep, the worlds that C considers possible after  should be
just the ones that were possible before . We can check that
hX;x6i j= :2C(2ADA _2A:DA):
Let ’ be the sentence above. Then also, hX;x6i j= 2fA;B;Cg’. This is our formal statement that
it is common knowledge in the group of three children that ’ holds. The semantics of this is that
for all sequences D1; : : : ; Dm 2 fA;B;Cg, hX;x6i j= 2D1   2Dm’. Note that we have no way of
saying in the modal language that C suspects that an announcement happened; the best we can do
is (roughly) to say that C thinks that some sentence  is possible in the sense that  holds in some
possible world. Of course, we have no way to say that A and B know that C was asleep, either.
Note as well that in X , we do not have x6!C x6. In other words, the real world would not be
possible for C. This is some indication that something strange is going on in this model. Further, we
consider the model of what happens after A and B’s announcement. Then in this model, no worlds
would be accessible for C from the actual world. These anomalies should justify our interest in the
more complicated scenarios and models involving suspicions of announcements.
The Model obtained by announcing 0 in X . This would be the one-world model below:
World A B C !A !B !C
x6
p   x6 x6
We have not only deleted the worlds where either A or B does not know that they are dirty in X , but
we also discarded all worlds not reachable from the new version x6 of x6. The anomaly here is that
C thinks no worlds are possible.
The Model Y . We consider γ from Scenario 3, in which C thought she might have heard A and
B, while A and B think that C is unaware of γ. We get the model Y displayed in Figure 1 below.
Y has 24 worlds, and so we won’t justify all of them individually. We will give a more principled
construction of Y from W and γ, once we have settle on a mathematical model of γ. For now, the
ideas are that the y worlds are those where the announcement happened, and the y0 worlds are those
in which it did not. Note that some of the y worlds are missing, since the truthful announcement by
A and B presupposes that they don’t know whether they are dirty in U at the corresponding world.
The x’s and u’s are from above, and they inherit the accessibility relations which we have seen.
Now our main intuition here is that hU; u6i j= 2C’ i hY; y6i j= 2+fA;Bg2C’. (The sentence
2+fA;Bg means that A knows ’, A knows B knows , etc. It diers from 2

fA;Bg in that it does not
entail that  is true.) To see this, note that u6!C u6; u7 and no other worlds. And the only worlds
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World A B C !A !B !C
u1; : : : ; u7
x1; x3; x5; x6; x7
y1  x1; x5 x1; x3 y1; y01
y3   x3; x7 x1; x3 y3; y02; y03
y5   x1; x5 x5; x7 y5; y04; y05
y6
p   x6 x6 y6; y7; y06; y07
y7    x3; x7 x5; x7 y6; y7; y06; y07
y01  u1; u5 u1; u3 y1; y01
y02  u2; u6 u2 y3; y02; y03
y03   u3; u7 y1; y3 y3; y02; y03
y04  u4 u4; u6 y5; y4; y05
y05   u1; u5 u5; u7 y5; y04; y05
y06   u2; u6 u4; u6 y6; y7; y06; y07
y07    u3; u7 u5; u7 y6; y7; y06; y07
Figure 1: The model Y
reachable from y6 using one or more !A or !B transitions followed by a !C transition are again u6
and u7.
Another intuition is that in hY; y6i, C should think that it is possible that A knows that he is dirty.
This is justied since y6!C x6, and hY; x6i = hX;x6i (that is, the submodels of X and Y generated
by x6 are isomorphic), and hX;x6i j= 2ADA.
Our nal intuition is that in hY; y6i, C should know that if A were to subsequently announce that
he knows that he is dirty, then C would know that B knows that she is dirty. To check this, we need
to modify Y by deleting the worlds where A does not know that he is dirty. These include y7, y06 and
y07. In the updated model, the only world accessible for C from (the new version of) y6 is y6 itself,
and at y6 in the new structure, B correctly knows she is dirty.
The Model obtained by announcing 0 in Y . As when 0 is announced in X , we only keep the
worlds of Y worlds where both A or B do know they are dirty. So we drop y7, y06, and y
0
7.
World A B C !A !B !C
y6
p   x#6 x#6 y6
x#6   x#6 x#6
We also only keep the worlds accessible from y6 (this change is harmless). C knows she is not dirty.
Technically, A and B \know" this, but this is for the nonsensical reason that they \know" that C
knows everything.
8The Model Z. Corresponding to Scenario 4, we get the model Z shown below.
w A B C !A !B !C
z1  z1; z5 z1; z3 z1; z01
z2  z2 z2 z2; z3; z02; z03
z3   z3; z7 z1; z3 z2; z3; z02; z03
z4  z4 z4 z4; z5; z04; z05
z5   z1; z5 z5; z7 z4; z5; z04; z05
z6
p   z6 z6 z6; z7; z06; z07
z7    z3; z7 z5; z7 z6; z7; z06; z07
w A B C !A !B !C
z01  z01; z05 z01; z03 z1; z01
z02  z02; z06 z2; z02 z2; z3; z02; z03
z03   z03; z07 z01; z03 z2; z3; z02; z03
z04  z04; z06 z04; z06 z4; z5; z04; z05
z05   z01; z05 z05; z07 z4; z5; z04; z05
z06   z02; z06 z04; z06 z6; z7; z06; z07
z07    z03; z07 z05; z07 z6; z7; z06; z07
Recall our last point in Scenario 4, that we need to consider a few possible announcements for C to
suspect. This is reflected in the fact that the z worlds are of three types. In z2, B announced that
she knows whether she is dirty, and A announced that he doesn’t. Similar remarks apply to z4. In
all other z worlds, both announced that they do not know. The worlds accessible from each of these
is based on the relevant announcement. For example, in z2, neither A nor B thinks any other world
is possible. (One might think that z2!A z6. But in z6, B could not announce that she knows she is
dirty. So if the world were z2 and the relevant announcement made, then A would not think z6 is
possible.) The z0 worlds are those in which no announcement actually happened.
Our key intuition was that it is common knowledge that C suspects that  happened. This will not
correspond to anything in the formal language L([];2) introduced later in this paper. (However,
it will be representable in an auxiliary language about actions; see Example 2.3.) Informally, the
intuition is valid for Z because for every zi (or z0i) there is some zj (unprimed) such that zi!C zj
(or z0i!C zj). In addition, in this particular model there is a sentence in our formal language which
happens to hold only at the worlds where an announcement occurred. Here is one:
  2ADA _ 2A:DA _ 3fA;Bg3C2ADA
So hZ; z6i j= 2fA;B;Cg3C.
The explanation of the mistaken intuition in Scenario 4 is that z6!C z7!A z3, and 3A2ADA fails in
z2, z3, z02, and z
0
3.. Overall, hZ; z6i j= :2C2A3A2ADA.
The point that C’s suspicion varies corresponds to the fact that 3C3A3C2A:DA holds at hZ; z6i.
Indeed z6!C z06!A z02!C z2, and hZ; z2i j= 2A:DA.
A few more involved statements are true in Z. For example, 2fA;B;Cg(2ADA ! 3C2ADA). It is
common knowledge to all three that if A knows he is dirty, then C thinks it possible that A knows
this.
The Model obtained by announcing 0 in Z. This model is W from above. (Actually, it is
bisimilar to W ; see Section 2.2.) This corresponds to the intuition that Scenarios 2.5 and 4.5 lead to
the same model.
1.2 Epistemic Actions
We will formalize a language in Section 2 along with the notions of (epistemic) action structure and
actions. Before we do that, it makes sense to present the idea informally based on the examples which
we have already dealt with.
 and 0: announcements to everyone. We rst consider  of Scenario 1. Let  be given by
 := :(2ADA _2A:DA) ^ :(2BDB _2B:DB) (1.1)
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So  says that neither A nor B know whether or not they are dirty. This is the precondition of the
announcement, but it is not the structure. The structure of this announcement is quite simple (so
much so that the reader will need to read further to get an idea for what we mean by structure). It is
the following Kripke structure K: we take one point, call it k, and we set k!D k for all D 2 fA;B;Cg.
We call hK; ki an action structure. Along with K, we also have a precondition; this will be  from
(1.1). To deal with action structures with more than one point, the precondition will be a function
pre from worlds to sentences. In this case, the function pre is just fhk;  ig. The tuple hK; k;prei will
be an example of what we call an action. This particular action is our model of the announcement .
Henceforth we use the symbol  to refer ambiguously to the pretheoretic notion of the announcement
event and to our mathematical model of it.
Another example of an announcement to everyone is 0. Here we just change  from (1.1) to the
sentence  0 which says that both A and B know whether or not they are dirty. Yet another example
is the null announcement. This models the announcement of a tautology true to everyone. We’ll write
this as  .
: a secure announcement to a set of agents. Next, suppose we have an announcement
made to some possibly proper subset B  A in the manner of Scenario 2. So there is some dispute
as to what happened: the agents in B think that there was an announcement, while those out of B
are sure that nothing happened. We formalize this with a Kripke structure of two points, l and t.
We set l!D l for all D 2 B, l!D t for D =2 B, and t!D t for all D. The point is that l here is the
actual announcement, and the agents in B know that this is the announcement. The agents not in
B think that t is for sure the only possible action, and t in this model will behave just like the null
announcement. The precondition function will be called pre in all of our examples. Here pre is given
by pre(l) =  and pre(t) = true, where  is from (1.1). The action overall is hL; l;prei, where
L = fl; tg. We call this action .
γ: an announcement with a suspicious outsider. This is based on Scenario 3. The associated
structure has four points, as follows:
World !A !B !C pre
m
p
l l m; n  
n t t m; n true
l l l t  
t t t t true
The idea is that m is the (private) announcement that C suspects, and n is other announcement that
C thinks is possible (where nothing was communicated by A and B). Then if m happened, A and B
were sure that what happened was l; similarly, if n happened, A and B would think that t was what
happened. We call this action γ; technically it is hfm;n; l; tg;m;prei. We get a dierent action, say
γ0 if we use the same model as above but change the designated (\real") world from m to n.
: an announcement with common knowledge of suspicion. Corresponding to Scenario 4,
we have the following model. In it  A denotes the sentence saying that A knows whether he is dirty
but B does not,  B the sentence saying that B knows whether she is dirty but A does not, and  ;
the sentence stating that neither knows.
World !A !B !C pre
o
p
o o o; s  
p p p p; s  A
q q q q; s  B
r r r r; s  ;
s s s o; p; q; r; s true
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We call this action . There are ve possible actions here, depending on whether it was  ,  A,  B ,  ;
or nothing which was announced. In each case, A and B are sure of what happened. Even if nothing
actually happened (s), C would suspect one of the other four possibilities. In those, C still considers
it possible that nothing happened.
Still to come. The reader is perhaps wondering what the actual connection is between the (formal)
actions just introduced and the concrete models of the previous section. The connection is that there
is a way of taking a model and an action and producing another model. When applied to the specic
model U and the actions of this section, we get the models V , : : : , Z. We delay this connection until
Section 2.2 below, since it is high time that we introduce our language of epistemic actions and its
semantics. The point is that there is a principled reason behind the models.
The question also arises as to whether there are any principles behind the particular actions which
we put down in this section. As it happens, there is more which can be said on this matter. We
postpone that discussion until Section 2.3, after we have formally dened the syntax and semantics
of our logical languages.
1.3 The Issues
The main issue we address in this paper is to formally represent epistemic updates, i.e., changes in
the information states of agents in a distributed system. We think of these changes as being induced
by specic information-updating actions, which can be of various types: (1) information-gathering
and processing (e.g., realizing the possibility of other agents’ hidden actions, and more generally,
learning of any kind of new possibility via experiment, computation, or introspection); (2) information-
exchange and communication (learning by sending/receiving messages, public announcements, secret
interception of messages, etc.); (3) information-hiding (lying or other forms of deceiving actions,
such as communication over secret channels, sending encrypted messages, holding secret suspicions);
(4) information-loss and misinformation (being lied to, starting to have gratuitous suspicions, non-
introspective learning, wrong computations or faulty observations, paranoia); (5) and more generally
sequential or synchronous combinations of all of the above.
Special cases of our logic, dealing only with public or semi-public announcements to mutually isolated
groups, have been considered in Plaza [13], Gerbrandy [5, 6], and Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [7].
These deal with actions such as  and  in our Introduction. Our examples γ and  go beyond what
is possible in the setting of these papers. But our overall setting is much more liberal setting, since it
allows for all the above-mentioned types of actions. We feel it would be interesting to study further
examples with an eye towards applications, but we leave this to other papers.
In our formal system, we capture only the epistemic aspect of these real actions, disregarding other
(intentional) aspects. In particular, for simplicity reasons, we only deal with \‘purely epistemic"
actions; i.e., the ones that do not change the facts of the world, but aect only the agents’ beliefs
about the world. However, this is not an essential limitation, as our formal setting can be easily
adapted to express fact-changing actions (see the end of Section 2.3 and also Section 5.3).
On the semantical side, the main original technical contribution of our paper lies in our decision to
represent not only the epistemic states, but also the epistemic actions, by Kripke structures. While
for states, these structures represent in the usual way the uncertainty of each agent concerning the
current state of the system, we similarly use action-structures to represent the uncertainty of each
agent concerning the current action taking place. The intuition is that we are dealing with potentially
"half-opaque/half-transparent" actions, about which the agents may be incompletely informed, or even
completely misinformed. Besides the structure, actions have preconditions, dening their domain of
applicability: not every action is possible in every state. We model the update of a state by an action
as a partial update operation, given by a restricted product of the two structures: the uncertainties
present in the given state and the given action are multiplied, while the \impossible" combinations of
states and actions are eliminated (by testing the actions’ preconditions on the state). The underlying
intuition is that the agent’s uncertainties concerning the state and the ones concerning the action are
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mutually independent, except for the consistency of the action with the state.
On the syntactical side, we use a mixture of dynamic and epistemic logic, with dynamic modalities
associated to each action-structure, and with common-knowledge modalities for various groups of
agents (in addition to the usual individual-knowledge operators). We give a complete and decidable
axiomatization for this logic, and we prove various expressivity results. From a proof-theoretical
point of view, the main originality of our system is the presence of our Action Rule, an inference rule
capturing what might be called a notion of \epistemic (co)recursion". We understand this rule and our
Knowledge-Action Axiom (a generalization of Ramsey’s axiom to half-opaque actions) as expressing
fundamental formal features of the interaction between action and knowledge in multi-agent systems,
features that we think have not been formally expressed before.
1.4 Further Contents of This Paper
Section 2 gives our basic logic L([]) of epistemic actions and knowledge. The idea is to dene the
logic together with the action structures which we have just looked at informally. So in L([]) we
nally will present the promised formal versions of the announcements of Section 1.2. In Section 3
we present a sound and complete axiomatization of L([]). We add the common knowledge operators
to get L([];2) in Section 4. Completeness for this logic is proved in Section 5. Two results on
the expressive power are presented in Section 6. An Appendix contains some technical results which,
while needed for our work, seem to interrupt the flow of the paper.
2. A Logical Language with Epistemic Actions
2.1 Syntax
We begin with a set AtSen of atomic sentences, and we dene two sets simultaneously: the language
L([]), and a set of actions (over L([])).
L([]) is the smallest collection which includes AtSen and which is closed under :, ^, 2A for A 2 A,
and []’, where  is an action over L([]), and ’ 2 L([]).
An action structure (over L([])) is a pair hK;prei, where K is a nite Kripke frame over the set
A of agents, and pre is a map pre : K ! L. We will usually write K for the action structure
hK;prei. An action (over L([])) is a tuple  = hK; k;prei, where hK;prei is an action structure
over L([]), and k 2 K. Each action  thus is a nite set with relations !D for D 2 A, together with
a precondition function and a specied actual world.
The actions themselves constitute a Kripke frame Actions in the natural way, by setting
hK; k;prei !D hL; l;pre0i i K = L, pre = pre0, and k!D l in K: (2.1)
When  = hK; k;prei, we set pre() = pre(k). That is, pre() is the precondition associated to
the distinguished world of the action. For this reason, we often write pre() instead of pre(k).
Examples 2.1 All of the sentences mentioned in Section 1.1 are sentences of L([]), except for the
ones that use 2fA;B;Cg. This construct gives us a more expressive language, as we shall see. The
structures ,  , , γ, γ0, , and 0 described informally in Section 1.2 are bona de actions. As
examples of the accessibility relation on the class of actions, we have the following facts: !D 
and !D  for all D 2 fA;B;Cg; !B ; !C ; !C  ; γ−!AB ; γ; γ0!C γ; γ0; γ0−!AB  ; −!AB ,
0−!AB 0, and ; 0!C ; 0.
Many other types of examples are possible. We can represent misleading epistemic actions, e.g.
lying, or more generally acting such that some people do not suspect that your action is possible. We
can also represent gratuitous suspicion (\paranoia"): maybe no \real" action has taken place, except
that some people start suspecting some action (e.g., some private communication) has taken place.
2.2 Semantics
As with the syntax, we dene two things simultaneously: the semantic relation hW;wi j= ’, and a
partial operation (hW;wi; ) 7! hW;wi. Before this, we need another denition. Given a model W
and an action structure K, we dene the model WK as follows:
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1. The worlds of WK are the pairs (w; k) 2W K such that hW;wi j= pre(k).
2. For such pairs,
(w; k)!A (w0; k0) i w!A w0 and k!A k0: (2.2)
3. We interpret the atomic sentences by setting vWK ((w; k)) = vW (w). That is, p is true at (w; k)
in WK i p is true at w in W .
Given an action  = hK; ki and a model-world pair hW;wi, we say that hW;wi is dened i hW;wi j=
pre(k), and in that case we set hW;wi = hW;wihK;ki = hWK ; (w; k)i. One can now check that the
following holds for these denitions.
hW;wi!A hW;xi i hW;wi and hW;xi are dened,w!A x in W , and !A :
The semantics is given by extending the usual clauses for modal logic by one for actions:
hW;wi j= []’ i hW;wi is dened implies hW;wi j= ’:
As is customary, we abbreviate :[]:’ by hi’. Then we have
hW;wi j= hi’ i hW;wi is dened and hW;wi j= ’:
We also abbreviate the boolean connectives classically, and we let true denote some tautology such as
p _ :p.
The larger language L([];2) We also consider a larger language L([];2). This is dened by
adding operators 2B for all subsets B  A. (When we do this, of course we get more actions as well.)
The semantics works by taking 2B’ to abbreviate the innitary conjunction^
hA1;::: ;Ani2B
2A1   2An’:
Here B is the set of all sequences from B. This includes the empty sequence, so 2B’ logically implies
’.
Bisimulation Given two models, say K and L, over the same set of A of agents, a bisimulation
between K and L is a relation R  K  L such that if kRl and A 2 A, then:
1. For all atomic p, hK; ki j= p i hL; li j= p.
2. For all k!A k0 there is some l!A l0 such that k0Rl0.
3. For all l!A l0 there is some k!A k0 such that k0Rl0.
Given two model-world pairs hK; ki and hL; li, we write hK; ki  hL; li i there is some bisimulation
R such that kRl. It is a standard fact that if hK; ki  hL; li, then the two pairs agree on all
sentences of standard modal logic. In our setting, we also can speak about actions being bisimilar:
we change condition (1) above to refer to say that pre(k) = pre(l). It is easy now to check two
things simultaneously: (1) bisimilar pairs agree on all sentences of L([]); and (2) if hK; ki  hL; li
and   , then hK; ki  hL; li. Furthermore, these results extend to L([];2).
Examples 2.2 We look back at Section 1.1 for some examples. We use = to denote the relation
of isomorphism on model-world pairs. It is not hard to check the following: hU; u6i = hV; v6i,
hU; u6i = hX;x6i, hU; u6iγ = hY; y6i, and hU; u6i = hZ; z6i. For example, the isomorphism which
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shows that hU; u6i = hZ; z6i is (ui; o) 7! zi for i 6= 2; 4, (u2; q) 7! z2, (u4; p) 7! z4, and (ui; r) 7! z0i
for all i.
Let 0 be the action of announcing to all agents that both A and B do know whether they are
dirty. Then hV; v6i0 = hX;x6i. Moreover, hZ; v6i0  hX;x6i. Note that in this case we only have
bisimilarity. However, we know that our languages will not discriminate between bisimilar pairs, so
we can regard them as the same. This models our intuition that the epistemic states at the end of
Scenarios 1.5 and 4.5 should be the same.
Finally, all of the semantic facts about the various models in Section 1.1 now turn into precise state-
ments. For example, hU; u6i j= []3A2BDB. Also, hU; u6i j= [][0]2A;B;C2CDC . This formalizes
our intuition that if we start with hU; u6i, rst announce that each of A and B do not know their state,
then second announce that they each do know it, then at that point it will be common knowledge to
all three that C knows she is dirty.
2.3 More on Actions
In this section, we have a few remarks on actions. The point here is to clarify the relation between the
scenarios of Section 1 and the intuitions concerning them, and the corresponding actions of Section 1.2.
First and foremost, here are the the conceptual points involved in our formalization. The idea is
that epistemic actions present a lot of uncertainty. Indeed, what might be thought of as a single
action (or event) is naturally interpreted by agents in dierent ways. The various agents might be
unclear on what exactly happened, and again they might well have dierent interpretations on what
is happening. Our formalization reflects this by making epistemic actions into Kripke models. So our
use of possible-worlds modeling of actions is on a par with other uses of these models, and it inherits
all of the features and bugs of those approaches.
Next, we want to spell out in words what our proposal amounts to. The basic problem is to decide
how to represent what happens to a Kripke model W after an announcement . (Of course, we are
modeling  by an action in our formal sense.) Our solution begins by considering copies of W , one for
each action token k of  in which pre() holds. We can think of tagging the worlds of W with the
worlds of , and then we must give an account of the accessibility relation between them. The intuition
is that the agents’ relations to alternative worlds should be independent from their relations to other
possibilities for . So the accessibility relations of K and W should be combined independently. This
is expressed formally in (2.2).
The auxiliary language L^ has as atomic sentences all sentences ’ of L([];2). It has all boolean
connectives, standard modal operators 2A for A 2 A, and also group knowledge operators 2B for
B  A.
We interpret L^ on actions using the standard clauses for the connectives and modal operators, and
by interpreting the atomic sentences as follows hK; ki j= p i pre(k) = p.
Examples 2.3 The idea here is that the auxiliary language formalizes talk about what the dierent
agents think is happening in our announcements. We refer back to the actions of Section 1.2. For
example,  j= 2fA;B;Cg . Intuitively, in , it is common knowledge that  was announced. Another
example: that
 j= 2fA;B;Cg3C( _  A _  B):
That is, in , it is common knowledge that C thinks it is possible that some non-trivial announcement
happened. Recall that this was one of our basic intuitions about , one which is not in general statable
in our main language L([];2).
Denition Let hK; ki be a model-world pair, and let ’ be a sentence of L^. Then  characterizes
hK; ki i for all hL; li, hL; li j=  i hL; li  hK; ki.
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Proposition 2.4 Let hK; ki be a model-world pair with K nite. Then there is a sentence  of L^
which characterizes hK; ki.
Proof By replacing hK; ki by its quotient under the largest auto-bisimulation, we may assume that
if l 6= m, then hK; li 6 hK;mi. It is well-known that the relation of elementary equivalence in modal
logic is a bisimulation on models in which each world has nitely many arrows coming in and out.
It follows from this and the overall niteness of K that we can nd sentences ’l for l 2 K with the













Going back to our original hK; ki, let  be ’k ^2A . It is easy to check that each hK; li satises  ;
hence each satises 2A . Therefore hK; ki j= . We claim that  characterizes hK; ki. To see this,
suppose that hJ; ji j= . Consider the relation R  K  J given by
k0Rj0 i hJ; j0i j= ’k0 ^2A :
It is sucient to see that R is a bisimulation. We’ll verify half of this: suppose that k0Rj0 and
j0!A j00. By using  , we see that there is some k00 such that k0!A k00 and j00 j= ’k00 . And also, since
j= 2A ! 2A2A , we see that hJ; j00i j= 2A . This completes the proof. a
The connection of this result and our discussion of actions is that it is often dicult to go from
an informal description of an an epistemic action to a formal one along our lines. (For example, our
formulation of  was the last of several versions.) Presumably, one way to get a formal action in our
sense is to think carefully about which properties the action should have, express them in the auxiliary
language, and then write a characterizing sentence such as  in the proof of Proposition 2.4. Then
one can construct the nite model by standard methods. Although this would be a tedious process,
it seems worthwhile to know that it is available.
Our formalization of actions reflects some choices which one might wish to modify. One of these
choices is to take the range of the function pre to be some language. Another option would be to
have the range to be the power set of that language. This would make actions into Kripke models
over the whole set of sentences. (And so what we have done is like considering modal logic with the
restriction that at any world satises exactly one atomic sentence.) Taking this other option thus
brings actions and models closer. This idea is pursued in Baltag [1], a continuation of this work which
develops a \calculus of epistemic actions." This replaces the \semantic" actions of this paper with
action expressions. These expressions have nicer properties than the auxiliary language of this paper,
but it would take us too far aeld to discuss this further.
On a dierent matter, it makes sense to restrict attention from the full collection of actions as we
have dened it to the smaller collection of S5 actions, where each accessibility !A is an equivalence
relation. This corresponds to the standard move of restricting attention to models with this property,
and the reasons for doing this are similar. Intuitively, an S5 action is one in which every agent is
introspective (with respect to their own suspicions about actions). Moreover, the introspection is
accurate, and this fact is common knowledge.
A nal modication which is quite natural is to allow actions which change the world. One would
do this by adding to our notion of action a sentential update u. This would be a function dened
on AtSen and written in terms of update equations such as u(p) := p ^ q; u(q) = false, etc. We are
condent that our logical systems can be modied to reflect this change, and we discuss this at certain
points below. We decided not to make this change mostly in order to keep the basic notions as simple
as possible.
With respect to both of the changes mentioned in the last two paragraphs, it is not hard to modify
our logical work to get completeness results for the new systems. We discuss all of this in Section 5.3.
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Basic Axioms
All sentential validities
([]-normality) ‘ [](’!  )! ([]’! [] )
(2A-normality) ‘ 2A(’!  )! (2A’! 2A )
 (2C-normality) ‘ 2C(’!  )! (2C’! 2C )
Action Axioms
(Atomic Permanence) ‘ []p$ (pre()! p)
(Partial Functionality) ‘ []:$ (pre()! :[])
(Action-Knowledge) ‘ []2A’$ (pre()!
Vf2A[]’ : !A g)
 Mix Axiom ‘ 2C’! ’ ^
Vf2A2C’ : A 2 Cg
 Composition Axiom ‘ [][]’$ [  ]’
Modal Rules
(Modus Ponens) From ‘ ’ and ‘ ’!  ; infer ‘  
([]-necessitation) From ‘  ; infer ‘ [] 
(2A-necessitation) From ‘ ’; infer ‘ 2A’
 (2C-necessitation) From ‘ ’; infer ‘ 2C’
 Action Rule
Let  be a sentence, and let C be a set of agents. Let there be sentences  for all  such that
!C  (including  itself), and such that
1. ‘  ! [] .
2. If A 2 C and !A γ, then ‘ ( ^ pre())! 2Aγ .
From these assumptions, infer ‘  ! []2C .
Figure 2: The logical system for L([];2). For L([]), we drop the  axioms and rules.
3. A Logic for L([])
In Figure 2 below we present a logic for L([];2) which we shall study later. In this section, we
shall restrict the logic to the simpler language L([]). We do so partly to break up the study of a
system with many axioms and rules, and partly to emphasize the signicance of adding the innitary
operators 2B to L([]). To carry out the restriction, we forget the axioms and rules of inference in
Figure 2 which are marked by a . In particular    will be dened later (Section 4).
The rules of the system are all quite standard from modal logic. The Action Axioms are the
interesting new ones. In the Atomic Permanence axiom, p is an atomic sentence. The axiom then says
that announcements do not change the brute fact of whether or not p holds. This axiom reflects the
fact that our actions do not change any kind of local state. (We discuss an extension of our system
in Section 5.3 where this axiom is not sound.) The Partial Functionality Axiom corresponds to the
fact that the operation hW;wi 7! hW;wi is a partial function. The key axiom of the system is the
Action-Knowledge Axiom, giving a criterion for knowledge after an announcement. We will check
soundness of this axiom leaving checking soundness of other unstarred axioms and rules to the reader.
16
Proposition 3.1 The Action-Knowledge Axiom
[]2A’$ (pre()!
^
f2A[]’ : !A g)
is sound.
Proof We remind the reader that the relevant denitions and notation are found in Section 2.2. Let 
be the action hK; ki. Fix a pair hW;wi. If hW;wi j= :pre(), then both sides of our biconditional hold.
We therefore assume that hW;wi j= pre() in the rest of this proof. Assume that hW;wi j= 2A’.
Take some  such that !A . This  is of the form hK; k0i for some k0 such that k!A k0. Let
w!A w0. We have two cases: hW;w0i j= pre(k0), and hW;w0i j= :pre(k0). In the latter case,
hW;w0i j= []’ trivially. We’ll show this in the former case, so assume hW;w0i j= pre(k0). Then
(w0; k0) is a world of WK , and indeed (w; k)!A (w0; k0). Now our assumption that hW;wi j= 2A’
implies that hWK ; (w0; k0)i j= ’. This means that hW;w0i j= ’. Hence hW;w0i j= []’. Since  and
w0 were arbitrary, hW;wi j= V 2A[]’.
The other direction is similar. a
The rest of this section is devoted to the completeness result for L([]). The reader not interested in
this may omit the rest of this section, but at some points later we will refer back to the term rewriting
system R which we shall describe shortly. Our completeness proof is based on a translation of L([])
to ordinary modal logic L. And this translation is based on a term rewriting system to be called R.
The rewriting rules of R are:
[]p ; pre()! p
[]: ; pre()! :[] 
[]( ^ ) ; [] ^ []
[]2A ; pre()!
Vf2A[] : !A g
As in all rewrite systems, we apply the rules of R at arbitrary subsentences of a given sentence. (For
example, consider what happens with something like [][]’. We might rewrite []’ using some rule,
say to  . Then we might rewrite [] to something like [γ] , etc.)
Lemma 3.2 There is a relation < on the sentences of L([]) such that
1. < is wellfounded.
2. For all rules ’ ;  of R,  < ’.
3. A sentence ’ 2 L([]) is a normal form i it is a modal sentence (that is, ’ cannot be rewritten
i no actions occur in ’).
This takes some work, and because the details are less important than the facts themselves, we have
placed the entire matter in an Appendix to this paper. (The Appendix also discusses an extension of
the rewrite system R to a system R for the larger language L([];2), so if you read it at this point
you will need to keep this in mind.)
In the next result, we let L be ordinary modal logic over AtSen (where of course there are no
actions).
Proposition 3.3 There is a translation t : L([])! L such that for all ’ 2 L([]), ’ is semantically
equivalent to ’t.
Proof Every sentence ’ of L([]) may be rewritten to a normal form. By Lemma 3.2, the normal
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forms of ’ is a sentence in L. We therefore set ’t to be any normal form of ’, say the one obtained
by carrying out leftmost reductions. The semantic equivalence follows from the fact that the rewrite
rules themselves are sound, and from the fact that semantic equivalence is preserved by substitutions.
a
Lemma 3.4 (Substitution) Let ’ be any sentence, and let ‘  $ 0. Suppose that ’[p=] comes
from ’ by replacing p by  at some point, and ’[p=0] comes similarly. Then ‘ ’[p=]$ ’[p=0].
Proof By induction on ’. The key point is that we have necessitation rules for each []. a
Theorem 3.5 This logical system for L([]) is strongly complete:  ‘ ’ i  j= ’.
Proof The soundness half being easy, we only need to show that if  j= ’, then  ‘ ’. First,
t j= ’t. Since our system extends the standard complete proof system of modal logic, t ‘ ’t. Now
for each  of L([]), ‘ $ t. (This is an easy induction on < using Lemma 3.4.) As a result,  ‘ t
for all  2 . So  ‘ ’t. As we know ‘ ’t $ ’. So we have our desired conclusion:  ‘ ’. a
Strong completeness results of this kind may also be found in Plaza [13] and in Gerbrandy and
Groeneveld [7]. We discuss some of the history of the subject in Section 7.
4. A Logic for L([];2)
At this point, we turn to the completeness result for L([];2). It is easy to check that there is no
hope of getting a strong completeness result (where one has arbitrary sets of hypotheses). The best
one can hope for is weak completeness: ‘ ’ if and only if j= ’. Also, in contrast to our translations
results for L([]), the larger language L([];2) cannot be translated into L or even to L(2) (modal
logic with extra modalities 2B). We prove this in Theorem 6.2 below. So completeness results for
L([];2) cannot simply be based on translation.
Our logical system is listed in Figure 2 above. We discussed the fragment of the system which does
not have the  axioms and rules in Section 3. The 2C-normality Axiom and 2C-necessitation Rule are
standard, as is the Mix Axiom. We leave checking their soundness to the reader. The key features of
the system are thus the Composition Axiom and the Action Rule. We begin with the Action Rule,
restated below:
The Action Rule Let  be a sentence, and let C be a set of agents. Let there be sentences  for all
 such that !C  (including  itself), and such that
1. ‘  ! [] .
2. If A 2 C and !A γ, then ‘ ( ^ pre())! 2Aγ .
From these assumptions, infer ‘  ! []2C .
Remark We use !C as an abbreviation for the reflexive and transitive closure of the relationS
A2C !A . Recall that there are only nitely many  such that !C , since each is determined by
a world of the same nite Kripke frame that determines . So even though the Action Rule might
look like it takes innitely many premises, it really only takes nitely many.
Another point: if one so desires, the Action Rule could be replaced by a (more complicated) axiom
scheme which we will not state here.
Lemma 4.1 hW;wi j= hi3C’ i there is a sequence of worlds from W
w = w0 !A1 w1 !A2    !Ak−1 wk−1 !Ak wk
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where k  0, and also a sequence of actions of the same length k,
 = 0 !A1 1 !A2    !Ak−1 k−1 !Ak k
such that Ai 2 C and hW;wii j= pre(i) for all 0  i  k, and hW;wki j= hki’.
Remark The case k = 0 just says that hW;wi j= hi3C’ is implied by hW;wi j= hi’.
Proof hW;wi j= hi3C’ i hW;wi j= pre() and hW; (w;)i j= 3C’; i hW;wi j= pre() and
there is a sequence in W,
(w;) = v0 !A1 v1 !A2    !Ak−1 vk−1 !Ak vk
where k  0 such that Ai 2 C and hW; vki j= ’. Now suppose such sequences exist in W. Then we
get a sequence of worlds wi in W and actions i such that vi = (wi; i) and hW;wii j= pre(i). The
condition that hW; vki j= ’ translates to hW;wki j= hki’. Conversely, if we have a sequence in W
with these properties, we get one in W by taking vi = (wi; i). a
Proposition 4.2 The Action Rule is sound.
Proof Assume that hW;wi j=  but also hW;wi j= hi3C: . According to Lemma 4.1, there is a
labeled sequence of worlds from W
w = w0 !A1 w1 !A2    !Ak−1 wk−1 !Ak wk
where k  0 and each Ai 2 C, and also a sequence of actions of length k, with the same labels,
 = 0 !A1 1 !A2    !Ak−1 k−1 !Ak k
such that hW;wii j= pre(i) for all 0 < i  k, and hW;wki j= hki: . If k = 0, we have hW;wi j=
hi: . But since ‘  ! [] , we have hW;wi j= [] . This is a contradiction.
Now we argue the case k > 0. We show by induction on 1  i  k that hW;wii j= i ^ [i] . In
particular, hW;wki j= [k] . This is a contradiction. a
We close with a discussion of the Composition Rule, beginning with a general denition.
Denition Let  = hK; ki and  = hL; li be actions. Then the action composition    is the
action dened as follows. Consider the product set K  L. We turn this into a Kripke frame using
the restriction of the product arrows. We get an action structure by setting
pre((k0; l0)) = pre(k0) ^ [hK; k0i]pre(l0):
Finally, we set    = hK  L; (k; l)i.
Proposition 4.3 Concerning the composition operation:
1. (W) = W via the restriction of ((w; k0); l0) 7! (w; (k0; l0)) to (W).
2. The Composition Axiom is sound: [][]’$ [  ]’.
3.   (  γ) = (  )  γ.
4.    =  =   , where the null action  is from Section 1.2.
Proof Let  = hK; ki and  = hL; li. For (1), note that the worlds of (W) are of the form
((w; k0); l0), where (w; k0) 2 W and hW; (w; k0)i j= pre(l0). For such ((w; k0); l0), hW;wi j= pre(k0)
and hW;wi j= [hK; k0i]pre(l0). That is, (w; (k0; l0)) 2 W . The converse is similar, and the rest of
the isomorphism properties are easy.
Part (2) follows from (1). We use the obvious isomorphism ((k; l);m) 7! (k; (l;m)) in part (3). We
use the Composition and []-necessitation axioms to show that this isomorphism preserves the pre
function up to logical equivalence. Part (4) is easy, using the fact that j= [ ]’$ ’. a
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Extending the rewriting system R to L([];2). We consider L([];2). The rewriting system R
extends naturally to this larger language, taking new symbols for the operators 2B. We also add a
rule corresponding to the Composition Axiom: [][]’ ; [  ]’. We call this rewriting system R.
Lemma 4.4 There is a relation < on the sentences and actions of L([];2) such that
1. < is wellfounded.
2. For all rules ’ ;  of R,  < ’.
3. If  is a proper subsentence of ’, then  < ’.
4. A sentence ’ 2 L([];2) is a normal form i it is built from atomic sentences using :, ^, 2A,
and 2B, or if it is of the form []2

B , where  is an action in normal form, and  too is in
normal form.
5. An action  is a normal form if whenever ! , pre() is a normal form sentence.
6. If ! , then []2C > [] .
7. nf(’)  ’.
Once again, the details are in the Appendix.
In Section 3, we saw a translation t from L([]) to L can be extended to a translation from L([];2)
to the innitary language L1, where we have countable conjunctions and disjunctions. This extension








hA1;::: ;Ani2B([]2A1   2An )t
In this way, we see that L([];2) may be regarded as a fragment of innitary modal logic.
Remark It is possible to drop the Composition Axiom in favor of a more involved version of the
Action Rule. The point is the Composition Axiom simplies the normal forms of the L([];2):
Without the Composition Axiom, the normal forms of sentences of L([];2) would be of the form
[1][2]    [r] , where each i is a normal form action and  is a normal form sentence. The
Composition Axiom insures that the normal forms are of the form [] . So if we were to drop the
Composition Axiom, we would need a formulation of the Action Rule which involved sequences of
actions. It is not terribly dicult to formulate such a rule, and completeness can be obtained by an
elaboration of the work which we shall do. We did not present this work, mostly because adding the
Composition Axiom leads to shorter proofs.
This completes the discussion of the axioms and rules of our logical system for L([];2).
5. Completeness for L([];2)
In this section, we prove the completeness of the logical system for L([];2). Section 5.1 has some
technical results which culminate in the Substitution Lemma 5.3. This is used in some of our work
on normal forms in the Appendix, and that work gures in the completeness theorem of Section 5.2.
5.1 Some Syntactic Results
Lemma 5.1 For all A 2 C and all  such that !A ,
1. ‘ []2C ! [] .
2. ‘ []2C ^ pre()! 2A[]2C .
Proof Part (1) follows easily from the Mix Axiom and modal reasoning. For part (2), we start with a
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consequence of the Mix Axiom: ‘ 2C ! 2A2C . Then by modal reasoning, ‘ []2C ! []2A2C .
By the Action-Knowledge Axiom, , we have ‘ []2C ^ pre()! 2A[]2C . a
Denition Let  and 0 be actions. We write ‘  $ 0 if  and 0 are based on the same
Kripke frame W and the same world w, and if for all v 2 W , ‘ pre(v) $ pre0(v), where pre is the
announcement function for , and pre0 for 0.
We note the following bisimulation-like properties:
1. If ‘ $ 0, then also ‘ pre()$ pre(0).
2. Whenever 0 is such that 0 !C 0, then there is some  such that ‘  $ 0 and !C .
These follow easily from the way we dened pre on actions in terms of functions on frames.
Lemma 5.2 If ‘ $ 0, then for all  , ‘ [] $ [0] .
Proof By induction on  . For  atomic, our result is easy. The induction steps for : and ^ are
trivial. The step for 2A is not hard, and so we omit it. Assuming the result for  gives the result for
[] , using the Composition Axiom and the induction hypothesis. This leaves the step for sentences of
the form 2B , assuming the result for  . We use the Action Rule to show that ‘ []2C ! [0]2C .
For each 0, we let 0 be []2C , where  is such that ‘  $ 0. We need to show that for all
relevant 0 and γ0,
a. ‘ []2C ! [0] ; and
b. If 0!A γ0, then ‘ []2C ^ pre(0)! 2A[γ]2C .
For (a), we know from Lemma 5.1, part (1) that ‘ []2C ! [] . By induction hypothesis on
 , ‘ [] $ [0] . And this implies (a). For (b), Lemma 5.1, part (2) tells us that under the
assumptions,
‘ []2C ^ pre()! 2A[γ]2C :
As we know, ‘ pre()$ pre(0). This implies (b).
This completes the induction on  . a
Lemma 5.3 (Substitution) Let t be a sentence or action of L([];2), and let ‘ $ 0. Suppose
that t[p=] comes from t by replacing p by  at some point, and t[p=0] comes similarly. Then
‘ t[p=]$ t[p=0].
Proof By induction on t, using Lemma 5.2. a
Lemma 5.4 For every sentence ’ 2 L([];2) there is some normal form nf (’)  ’ such that
‘ ’$ nf (’).
Proof Given ’, there is a nite sequence ’0 ;    ; ’n = ’0 such that ’0 = ’, and ’n is in
normal form. This is a consequence of the fact that < is wellfounded and the rules of the system are
reducing. By Lemma 5.3, we see that for all i, ‘ ’i $ ’0i. a
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5.2 Completeness
The proof of completeness and decidability is based on the ltration argument for completeness of
PDL due to Kozen and Parikh [10]. We show that every consistent ’ has a nite model, and that the
size of the model is recursive in ’. We shall need to use some results concerning the rewriting system
R from Section 4.
Denition Let s(’) be the set of subsentences of ’, including ’ itself. This includes all sentences
occurring in actions which occur in ’ and their subsentences. For future use, we note that
s([]2C’) = f[]2C’;2C’g [ s(’) [
Sfs(pre()) : !C g (5.1)
We dene a function f : L([];2) ! P(L([];2)) by recursion on the wellfounded relation < as
follows: For normal forms, f works as follows:
f(p) = fpg
f(:’) = f(’) [ f:’g
f(’ ^  ) = f(’) [ f( ) [ f’ ^  g
f(2A’) = f(’) [ f2A’g
f(2B’) = f(’) [ f2B’g [ f2A2B’ : A 2 Bg
f([]2C’) = f2A[]2C’ : !C  & A 2 Cg
[ f[]2C’ : !C  & A 2 Cg
[ Sff() : (9) !C  &  2 s(pre())g
[ f(2C’)
[ Sff([]’) : !C g
For ’ not in normal form, let f(’) = f(nf (’)). (Note that we need to dene f on sentences which are
not normal forms, because f([] ) gures in f([]2C’). Also, the denition makes sense because the
calls to f on the right-hand sides are all < the arguments on the left-hand sides, and since nf (’)  ’
for all ’; see Lemma 4.4.)
Lemma 5.5 For all ’:
1. f(’) is a nite set of normal form sentences.
2. nf (’) 2 f(’).
3. If  2 f(’), then f( )  f(’).
4. If  2 f(’), then s( )  f(’).
5. If [γ]2C 2 f(’), γ !C , and A 2 C, then f(’) also contains 2A[]2C, []2C, pre(), and
nf ([]).
Proof All of the parts are by induction on ’ in the well-order <. For part (1), note that if []2C is
a normal form, then each sentence 2A[]2C and all subsentences of this sentence are normal forms.
For part (2), note that when ’ is a normal form, ’ 2 f(’).
In part (3), we only need to consider ’ in normal form. The result is immediate when ’ is an
atomic sentence p. The induction steps for :, ^, and 2A are easy. For 2B’, note that since ’ < 2B’,
our induction hypothesis implies the result for ’; we verify it for 2B’. The only interesting case is
when  is 2A2B’ for some A 2 B. And in this case
f( ) = f(2B’) [ f2A2B’g  f(2B’):
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To complete part (3), we consider []2C’. If there is some  < []2

C’ such that  2 f() and
f()  f([]2C’), then we are easily done by the induction hypothesis. This covers all of the cases
except for  = []2C’ and  = 2A[]2

C’. For the rst of these, we use the transitivity of !C to
check that f([]2C’)  f([]2C’). And now the second case follows:
f(2A[]2C’) = f([]2

C’) [ f2A[]2C’g  f([]2C’):
Part (4) is similar to part (3), using equation (5.1) at the beginning of this subsection.
For part (5), assume that [γ]2C 2 f(’). By part (1), [γ]2C is a normal form. We show that
2A[]2C, []2

C, pre(), and nf ([]) all belong to f([γ]2

C), and then use part (3). The rst two
of these sentences are immediate by the denition of f ; the third one follows from part (4); and the
last comes from part (2) since nf ([]) 2 f([])  f([γ]2C. a
The set  = (’) Fix a sentence ’. We set  = f(’) (i.e., we drop ’ from the notation). This
set  is the version for our logic of the Fischer-Ladner closure of ’. Let  = f 1; : : : ;  ng. Given a
maximal consistent set U of L([];2), let
[[U ]] = + 1 ^    ^+ n;
where the signs are taken in accordance with membership in U . That is, if  i 2 U , then  is a
conjunct of [[U ]]; but if  i =2 U , then : i is a conjunct.
Two (standard) observations are in order. Notice that if [[U ]] 6= [[V ]], then [[U ]]^ [[V ]] is inconsistent.
Also, for all  2 ,
‘  $
_




f[[W ]] : W is maximal consistent and : 2Wg: (5.3)
(The reason is that  is equivalent to the disjunction of all complete conjunctions which contain it.
However, some of those complete conjunctions are inconsistent and these can be dropped from the big
disjunction. The others are consistent and hence can be extended to maximal consistent sets.)
Denition The ltration F is the model whose worlds are the equivalence classes [U ], where U is a
maximal consistent set in the logic for L([];2), and the equivalence relation is U  V i [[U ]] = [[V ]]
(i U \ = V \). We set hF ; [U ]i j= p i p 2 U \. Furthermore,
[U ]!A [V ] in F i whenever 2A 2 U \, then also  2 V : (5.4)
This condition is independent of the choice of representatives: we use part (4) of Lemma 5.5 to see
that if 2A 2 , then also  2 .
A good path from [V0] for hi3C is a path in F
[V0] !A1 [V1] !A2    !Ak−1 [Vk−1] !Ak [Vk]
such that k  0, each Ai 2 C, and such that there exist actions
 = 0 !A1 1 !A2    !Ak−1 k−1 !Ak k
such that pre(i) 2 Vi for all 0  i  k, and hki 2 Vk.
The idea behind a good path comes from considering Lemma 4.1 in F . Of course, the special case of
that result would require that hF ; [Vi]i j= pre(i) rather than pre(i) 2 Vi, and similarly for hki 
and Vk. The exact formulation above was made in order that the Truth Lemma will go through for
sentences of the form hi3C (see the nal paragraphs of the proof of Lemma 5.8).
Lemma 5.6 Let []2C 2 . If there is a good path from [V0] for hi3C: , then hi3C: 2 V0.
Proof By induction on the length k of the path. If k = 0, then hi: 2 V0. If hi3C: =2 V0, then
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[]2C 2 V0. By Lemma 5.1, part (1), we have [] 2 V0. This is a contradiction.
Assume the result for k, and suppose that there is a good path from [V0] for hi3C: of length k+1.
Then there is a good path of length k from [V1] for h1i3C: . Also, [1]2C 2 , by Lemma 5.5,
part (5). By induction hypothesis, h1i3C: 2 V1.
If hi3C: =2 V0, then []2C 2 V0. By Lemma 5.1, part (2), V0 contains []2C ^ pre() !
2A[1]2C . So V0 contains 2A[1]2

C . Again, this sentence belongs to  by Lemma 5.5, part (5).
Now by denition of !A in F , we see that [1]2C 2 V1. This is a contradiction. a
Lemma 5.7 If [[V0]] ^ hi3C is consistent, then there is a good path from [V0] for hi3C .
Proof For each  such that !C , let S be the (nite) set of all [W ] 2 F such that there is no
good path from [W ] for hi3C . We need to see that [V0] =2 S; suppose toward a contradiction that
[V0] 2 S. Let
 =
_
f[[W ]] : W 2 Sg:
Note that : is logically equivalent to
Wf[[W 0]] : [W 0] 2 F and W 0 =2 Sg. Since we assumed V0 2 S,
we have ‘ [[V0]]! .
We rst claim that  ^ hi is inconsistent. Otherwise, there would be [W ] 2 S such that
 ^ hi 2 W . Note that by the Partial Functionality Axiom, ‘ hi ! pre(). But then the
one-point path [W ] is a good path from [W ] for hi3C . Thus [W ] =2 S, and this is a contradiction.
So indeed,  ^ hi is inconsistent. Therefore, ‘  ! []: .
We will need the following standard claim, an argument for which can be found in Kozen and
Parikh [10]. We will also use this claim in the proof of Lemma 5.8.
Claim If [[U ]] ^3A[[V ]] is consistent, then [U ]!A [V ].
Proof of Claim Assume 2A 2 U \. If  62 V , then : 2 V , so since  2 , ‘ [[V ]]! : . Thus,
‘ 3A[[V ]] ! 3A: , and so ‘ [[U ]] ^ 3A[[V ]] ! 2A ^ 3A: , whence [[U ]] ^ 3A[[V ]] is inconsistent.
This contradiction establishes the claim.
We next show that for all A 2 C and all  such that  !A γ,  ^pre()^3A:γ is inconsistent.
Otherwise, there would be [W ] 2 S with  , pre(), and 3A:γ in it. Then
Wf3A[[W 0]] : W 0 62 Sγg,
being equivalent to 3A: , would belong to W . It follows that 3A[[W 0]] 2 W for some W 0 62 Sγ .
By the claim, [W ] !A [W 0]. Since [W 0] =2 Sγ , there is a good path from [W 0] for hγi3C . But
since  !A γ and W contains pre(), we also have a good path from [W ] for hi3C . This again
contradicts [W ] 2 S . As a result, for all relevant A, , and γ, ‘  ^ pre()! 2Aγ :
By the Action Rule, ‘  ! []2C: . Now ‘ [[V0]]! . So ‘ [[V0]]! []2C: . This contradicts
the assumption with which we began this proof. a
Lemma 5.8 (Truth Lemma) Consider a sentence ’, and also the set  = f(’). For all  2 
and [U ] 2 F :  2 U i hF ; [U ]i j= .
Proof We argue by induction on the wellfounded < that if  2 , then:  2 U i hF ; [U ]i j= .
The case of  atomic is trivial. Now assume this Truth Lemma for sentences < . Note that by
soundness, we may assume that  is in normal form. We argue by cases on .
The cases that  is either a negation or conjunction are trivial.
Suppose next that   2A . Suppose 2A 2 U ; we show hF ; [U ]i j= 2A . Let [V ] be such that
[U ]!A [V ]. Then by denition of !A ,  2 V . The induction hypothesis applies to  , since  < 2A ,
and since  2  by Lemma 5.5, part (4). So by induction hypothesis, hF ; [V ]i j=  . This gives half
of our equivalence. Conversely, suppose that hF ; [U ]i j= 2A . Suppose towards a contradiction that
3A: 2 U . So [[U ]]^3A: is consistent. We use equation (5.3) and the fact that 3A distributes over
disjunctions to see that [[U ]]^3A: is logically equivalent to
W
([[U ]]^3A[[V ]]), where the disjunction is
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taken over all V which contain : . Since [[U ]]^3A: is consistent, one of the disjuncts [[U ]]^3A[[V ]]
must be consistent. The induction hypothesis again applies, and we use it to see that hF ; [V ]i j= : .
By the claim in the proof of Lemma 5.7, [U ]!A [V ]. We conclude that hF ; [U ]i j= 3A: , and this is
a contradiction.
For  of the form 2C , we use the standard argument for PDL (see Kozen and Parikh [10]). This
is based on lemmas that parallel Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7. The work is somewhat easier than what we do
below for sentences of the form []2C , and so we omit these details.
We conclude with the case when  is a normal form sentence of the form []2C 2 . Assume that
[]2C 2 . First, suppose that []2C =2 U . Then by Lemma 5.7, there is a good path from [U ] for
hi3C: . We want to apply Lemma 4.1 in F to assert that hF ; [U ]i j= hi3C: . Let k be the length
of the good path. For i  k, pre(i) 2 Ui. Now each pre(i) belongs to  by Lemma 5.5, part
(5), and is < []2C . So by induction hypothesis, hF ; [Ui]i j= pre(i). We also need to check that
hF ; [Uk]i j= hki: . For this, recall from Lemma 5.5, part (5) that  contains nf ([k] )  [k] .
By Lemma 4.4, nf ([k] )  [k] < []2C . Since the path is good, Uk contains hki: and hence
:[k] . It also must contain the normal form of this, by Lemma 5.4. So by induction hypothesis,
hF ; [Uk]i j= nf (:[k] ). By soundness, hF ; [Uk]i j= hki: . Now it does follow from Lemma 4.1 that
hF ; [U ]i j= hi3C: .
Going the other way, suppose that hF ; [U ]i j= hi3C: . By Lemma 4.1, we get a path in F
witnessing this. The argument of the previous paragraph shows that this path is a good path from
[U ] for hi3C: . By Lemma 5.6, U contains hi3C: . This completes the proof. a
Theorem 5.9 (Completeness) For all ’, ‘ ’ i j= ’. Moreover, this relation is decidable.
Proof By Lemma 5.4, ‘ ’$ nf (’). Let ’ be consistent. By the Truth Lemma, nf (’) holds at some
world in the ltration F . So nf (’) has a model; thus ’ has one, too. This establishes completeness.
For decidability, note that the size of the ltration is computable in the size of the original ’. a
5.3 Two Extensions
We briefly mention two extensions of the Completeness Theorem 5.9. These extensions come from
our discussion at the end of Section 2.3.
First, consider the case of S5 actions. We change our logical system by restricting to these S5
actions, and we add the S5 axioms to our logical system. We interpret this new system on S5 models.
It is easy to check that applying an S5 action to an S5 model gives another S5 model. Further, the S5
actions are closed under composition. Finally, if  is an S5 action and !A , then  also is an S5
action. These easily imply the soundness of the new axioms. For completeness, we need only check
that if we assume the S5 axioms, then the ltration F from the previous section has the property
that each !A is an equivalence relation. This is a standard exercise in modal logic (see, e.g., Fagin et
al [4], Theorem 3.3.1).
Our second extension concerns the move from actions as we have been working them to actions
which change the truth values of atomic sentences. If we make this move, then the axiom of Atomic
Permanence is no longer sound. However, it is easy to formulate the relevant axioms. For example,
if we have an action  which eects the change p := p ^ :q, then we would take an axiom []p $
(pre()! p^:q). Having made these changes, all of the rest of the work we have done goes through.
In this way, we get a completeness theorem for this logic.
6. Results on Expressive Power
In this section, we present two results which show that adding announcements to modal logic with
3 adds expressive power as does adding private announcements to modal logic with 3 and public
announcements. To show these results it will be sucient to take the set A of agents to be fA;Bg
and consider only languages contained in a language built-up from the atomic sentences p and q, using
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AB, and the actions [’]A, [’]B of announcing ’ to A or B privately, and
[’]AB the action of announcing ’ to A and B publicly. Let Lall stand for this language. We use here
the customary notation ([’]A, [’]B , [’]AB) for announcements, but [’]A is simply the action with the
Kripke structure K = fkg with !A from k to k and pre(k) = ’. We think of [’]B similarly. [’]AB is
the action with the Kripke structure K = fkg with !A and !B going from k to k and pre(k) = ’.
We need to dene a rank j’j on sentences from Lall. Let jpj = 0 for p atomic, j:’j = j’j,
j’^ j = max(j’j; j j), j:’j = j’j, j3X’j = 1+ j’j, for X = A or X = B, j3X’j = 1+ j’j for X = A,
X = B, or X = AB, and j[’]X j = max(j’j; j j) for X = A, X = B, or X = AB.
First we present a lemma which allows us, in certain circumstances, to do the following: from the
existence of a sentence in a language L1 which is not equivalent to any sentence in a language L0 infer
that there exists a sentence in L1 not equivalent to any theory in L0.
Lemma 6.1 Let L0 be a language included in Lall, and let  be a sentence in Lall. Assume that for
each n we have models Fn and Gn with some worlds fn 2 Fn and gn 2 Gn such that hFn; fni satises
: , hGn; gni satises  , and hFn; fni and hGn; gni agree on all sentences in L0 of rank  n. Then
3A is not equivalent with any theory in L0.
Proof For a sequence of model-world pairs hHn; hni, n 2 D  !, we let
L
n2D(Hn; hn) be a model-
world pair dened as follows. Let h be a new world. Take disjoint copies of the Hn’s and add an
A-arrow from h to each hn. All other arrows are within the Hn’s and stay the same as in Hn. No
atomic sentences are true at h. Atomic sentences true in the worlds belonging to the copy of Hn inL
n2D(Hn; hn) are precisely those true at the corresponding worlds of Hn.
Let F be
L
n2!(Fn; fn) with the new world denoted by f . Dene also F
m, for m 2 !, to beL
n2!(Hn; hn) with the new world f
m where Hm = Gm, hm = gm and for all n 6= m, Hn = Fn and
hn = fn
Now assume towards a contradiction that 3A is equivalent with a theory  in L0. Clearly 3A 
fails in hF; fi. Thus some sentence ’ 2  fails in hF; fi. On the other hand, each hFm; fmi satises
3A , whence hFm; fmi satises ’. Let m0 = j’j. The following claim shows that both hF; fi and
hFm0 ; fm0i make ’ true or both of them make it false, which leads to a contradiction.
Claim Let ’ be a sentence in  of rank  m. Let Hn, Kn, n 2 D, with hn 2 Hn and kn 2 Kn be
models such that hHn; hni and hKn; kni agree on sentences in  of rank  m. Then h
L
n(Hn; hn); hi
and hLn(Kn; kn); ki agree on ’.
This claim is proved by induction on complexity of ’. It is clear for atomic sentences. The induction
steps for boolean connectives are trivial. A moment of thought gives the induction step for 3 and
3 with various subscripts. It remains to consider the case when ’ = [’1]A’2. (The cases when
’ = [’1]B’2 and ’ = [’1]AB’2 are similar.) Fix Hn, Kn, hn 2 Hn, kn 2 Kn, with n 2 D, such that
hHn; hni and hKn; kni agree on sentences in  of rank  m. Note that, for each n 2 D, hHn; hni j= ’1
if and only if hKn; kni j= ’1. Let D1 be the set of all n 2 D for which hHn; hni j= ’1. Let H 0n and
K 0n be models obtained by updating Hn and Kn by [’1]A. By the denition of rank and the fact that





H 0n; hi j= ’2 i h
M
n2D1





Hn; hi j= ’ i h
M
n2D1





Kn; ki j= ’ i h
M
n2D1
K 0n; ki j= ’2;
and we are done. a
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6.1 Announcements add Expressive Power to Modal Logic with 2
In the result below, there will be only one agent A, and so we omit the letter A from the notation.
We let L([ ];3) be modal logic with announcements (to this A) and 3 = 3A. We also let L(3) be
the obvious sublanguage.
Theorem 6.2 There is a sentence of L([ ];3) which cannot be expressed by any set of sentences of
L(3).
Proof We show rst that [p]3+q = [p]33q cannot be expressed by any single sentence of L(2).
(Incidentally, the same holds for [p]3q.) Fix a natural number n. We dene structures A = An and
B = Bn as follows. First B has 2n+ 3 points arranged cyclically as
0! 1!    ! n! n+ 1! −n!    ! −1! 0:
For the atomic sentences, we set p true at all points except n+ 1, and q true only at 0.
The structure A is a copy of B with n more points 1; : : : ; n arranged as
0! 1!    ! n! 0:
The shape of A is a gure-8. In both structures, every point is reachable from every point by the
transitive closure of the ! relation. At the points i, p is true and q is false. Notice that 1 j= [p]3+q
in A, but 1 6j= [p]3+q in B.
The main technique in the proof is an adaptation of Fraisse-Ehrenfeucht games to the setting of
modal logic. Here is a description of the relevant game Gn(hU; ui; hV; vi). For n = 0, II immediately
wins if the following holds: for all p 2 AtSen, hU; ui j= p i hV; vi j= p. And if u and v dier on some
atomic sentence, I immediately wins. Continuing, here is how we dene Gn+1(hU; ui; hV; vi). As in
the case of G0, we rst check if u and v dier on some atomic sentence. If they do, then I immediately
wins. Otherwise, the play continues. Now I can make two types of moves.
1. 3-move
I has a choice of playing from U or from V . If I chooses U , then I continues by choosing some
u0 such that u ! u0 in U . Then II replies with some v0 2 V such that v ! v0. Of course, if I had
chosen in V , then II would have chosen in U . Either way, points u0 and v0 are determined, and the
two players then play Gn(hU; u0i; hV; v0i).
2. 3-move
I plays by selecting U (or V , but we ignore this symmetric case below), and then playing some u0
(say) reachable from u in the reflexive-transitive closure ! of !; II responds with a point in the
other model, V , which is similarly related to v.
We write hU; ui n hV; vi if II has a winning strategy in the game Gn(hU; ui; hV; vi). It is easy to
check that by induction on m that if hU; ui n hV; vi and m < n, then hU; ui m hV; vi.
Claim 1 If hU; ui n hV; vi, then for all ’ with j’j  n, hU; ui j= ’ i hV; vi j= ’.
The proof will be done by induction on ’. Let ’ be atomic. Suppose hU; ui n hV; vi. Then since
II has a winning strategy, the atomic sentences satised by u and v must be the same. So we are
done in this case.
The induction steps for the boolean connectives are trivial. For 2’, suppose that j2’j  n,
hU; ui n hV; vi, and hU; ui j= 2’. Suppose towards a contradiction that hV; vi j= 3:’. Let v0 be
such that v ! v0 in V and hV; v0i j= :’. Let I begin a play of Gn−1(hU; ui; hV; vi) by choosing to
play v0 2 V . Then II’s winning strategy responds with some u0 such that (U; u0) n−1 (V; v0). Since
j’j  n− 1, our induction hypothesis implies that hU; u0i j= 3:’. This is a contradiction.
The argument for 2’ is similar and we leave it to the reader. The claim is proved.
6. Results on Expressive Power 27
We return to the models A and B described in the beginning of this proof. For 0  i  n, we let
Si  A B be the following set
Si = f(0; 0); : : : ; (n; n); (n+ 1; n+ 1); (−n;−n); : : : ; (−1;−1)g
[ f(n;−1); (n− 1;−2) : : : ; (2;−(n− 1)); (1;−n)g
[ f(1; 1); : : : ; (n− i; n− i)g
In the case of i = n, then the last disjunct is empty. Note that S0  S1      Sn. Also, for
0  i  n, every point of one structure is related by Si to some point of the other.
Claim 2 If 0  i  n and (a; b) 2 Si, then hA; ai i hB; bi.
The proof is by induction on i. If i = 0, this is due to the fact that pairs in S0 agree on the atomic
formulas. Assume the statement for i, and that i+ 1  n. Let (a; b) 2 Si+1. We only need to show
that II can respond to any play and have the resulting pair belong to Si. Suppose rst that I plays
a 3-move. Suppose also that a = b, so that (a; a) comes from the rst subset of Si+1. In this case,
we only need to notice that (a+ 1; a+ 1) 2 Si if jaj  n, (−n;−n) 2 Si if a = n+ 1, and (1; 1) 2 Si
if a = 0, since i < n. The case of (a; b) from the second subset is similar. Finally, if (a; a) belongs to
the third subset of Si+1, then a  n− (i+ 1) = n− i− 1. So a+ 1  n− i, and (a+ 1; a+ 1) belongs
to the third subset of Si. This tells II how to play.
We remarked above that each Si is a total relation. Moreover, each world can be reached from any
other one in A and in B. This implies that if I makes a 3-move, II can respond. This completes the
proof of the claim.
It follows that hAn; 1i n hBn; 1i. So by Claim 1, for each sentence ’ 2 L(2) and all n  j’j,
hAn; 1i j= ’ i hBn; 1i j= ’. This shows that [p]3+q cannot be expressed by a single sentence in
L(3). To prove the stronger result as stated in Theorem 6.2, we only need to quote Lemma 6.1. a
6.2 Private Announcements Add Expressive Power
In this section, L([ ]AB;3) denotes the set of sentences built from p using [’]AB, 3A, 3B, 3A, 3B,
and 3AB. L([ ]A;3A) denotes the set built from p using [’]A, 3A, and 3B.
Theorem 6.3 There is a sentence of L([ ]A;3A) which cannot be expressed by any set of sentences
in L([ ]AB;3).
Proof We consider   [p]A3A3B:p.
Let Gn be the following model. We begin with a cycle in !A :
a1 !A a1 !A b !A an !A an−1 !A    !A a2 !A a1 (6.1)
We add edges ai!A b for all i (including i =1), and also x!A a1 for all x (again including x = a1).
The only !B edge is a1!B b. The atomic sentence p is true at all points except b.
The rst thing to note is that after a private update of p to A, hGn; aii j=  for all i < 1. The
relevant path is ai!A    !A a1!B b; the important point is that since the announcement was private,
the edge a1!B b survives the update. On the other hand, hGn; a1i j= :. This is because the only
way to go from a1 to b is to go through b, and the edge a1!A b is lost in the update.
Suppose towards a contradiction that  were equivalent to ’ 2 L([ ]AB;3). Let i = j’j, and let
n = i + 1. As we know from our discussion of , hGn; ani j=  and hGn; a1i j= :. However, this
contradicts the claim below.
Claim Assume that 1 < j  n, ’ 2 L([ ]AB;3) and j’j < j. Then hGn; aji j= ’ i hGn; a1i j= ’.
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The proof is by induction on ’. For ’ = p, the result is clear, as are the induction steps for : and
^. For 3A’, suppose that aj j= 3A’. Either a1 j= ’, in which case a1 j= 3A’, or else aj−1 j= ’.
In the latter case, by induction hypothesis, a1 j= ’; whence a1 j= 3A’. The converse is similar.
The case of 3B’ is trivial: aj j= :3B’ and a1 j= :3B’.
For 3A’, note that since we have a cycle (6.1) containing all points, the truth value of 3

A’ does
not depend on the point. The cases of 3B’ and 3

AB’ are similar.
For [’]AB , assume the result for ’ and  , and let j[’]AB j < j. Then also j’j < j and j j < j. Let
H = fx : x j= ’g be the updated model, and recall that hGn; xi j= [’]AB i x 2 H and hH;xi j=  .
We have two cases: First, H = Gn. Then hGn; xi j= [’]AB i hGn; xi j=  . So we are done by the
induction hypothesis.
The other case is when there is some x =2 H. If ak =2 H for some k  j or for k = 1, then all
these ak do not belong to H. In particular, neither aj nor a1 belong. And so both aj and a1 satisfy
[’]AB . If b =2 H, then H is bisimilar to a one-point model. This is because every ai 2 H would
have some !A -successor in H (e.g., a1), and there would be no !B edges. So we assume b 2 H.
Thus ai =2 H for some i < j. Let k be least so that for k  l  1, al j= ’. Then 1 < k  j. Let
Ak = fal : k  l  1g. The submodels generated by aj and a1 contain the same worlds: all worlds
in Ak and b. We claim that (Ak  Ak) [ fhb; big is a bisimulation on H. The verication here is
easy.
So in H, aj and a1 agree on all sentences in any language which is invariant for bisimulation. Now
L([ ]AB;3) has this property (as do all the languages which we study: they are translatable into
innitary modal logic). In particular, hH; aji j=  i hH; a1i j=  . This concludes the claim.
We get Theorem 6.3 directly from the claim, the observation that hGn; ani j=  and hGn; a1i j= :,
and Lemma 6.1. a
We feel that our two results on expressive power are just a sample of what could be done in this area.
We did not investigate the next natural questions: Do announcements with suspicious outsiders extend
the expressive power of modal logic with all secure private announcements and common knowledge
operators? And then do announcements with common knowledge of suspicion add further expressive
power?
7. Conclusions and Historical Remarks
The work of this paper builds on the long tradition of epistemic logic as well as technical results in
other areas. In recent times, one very active arena for work on knowledge is distributed systems, and
the main source of work in recent times on knowledge in distributed systems is the book Reasoning
About Knowledge [4] by Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi. We depart from [4] by introducing the
new operators for epistemic actions, and by doing without temporal logic operators. In eect, our
Kripke models are simpler, since they do not incorporate all of the runs of a system; the new operators
can be viewed as a compensation for that. We have not made a detailed comparison of our work with
the large body of work on knowledge on distributed systems, and such a comparison would require
both technical and conceptual results. On the technical side, we suspect that neither framework is
translatable into the other. One way to show this would be by expressivity results. Perhaps another
way would use complexity results. In this direction, we note that Halpern and Vardi [8] examines
ninety-six logics of knowledge and time. Thirty-two of these contain common knowledge operators,
and of these, all but twelve of these are undecidable. But overall, our logics are based on diering
conceptual points and intended applications, and so we are condent that they dier.
As far as we know, the rst paper to study the interaction of communication and knowledge in
a formal setting is Plaza’s paper \Logics of Public Communications" [13]. As the title suggests,
the epistemic actions studied are announcements to the whole group, as in our  and 0. Perhaps
the main result of the paper is a completeness theorem for the logic of public announcements and
knowledge. This result is closely related to a special case of our Theorem 3.5. The dierence is that
Plaza restricts attention to the case when all of the accessibility relations are equivalence relations.
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Incidentally, Plaza’s proof involves a translation to multi-modal logic, just as ours does. In addition
to this, [13] contains a number of results special to the logic of announcements which we have not
generalized, and it also studies an extension of the logic with non-rigid constants.
Other predecessors to this paper are the papers of Gerbrandy [5, 6] and Gerbrandy and Groene-
veld [7]. These study epistemic actions similar to our , where an announcement is made to set
of agents in a private way with no suspicions. They presented a logical system which included the
common knowledge operators. An important result is that all of the reasoning in the original Muddy
Children scenario can be carried out in their system. This shows that in order to get a formal treat-
ment of the problem, one need not posit models which maintain histories. They did not obtain the
completeness/decidability result for their system, but it would be the version of Theorem 5.9 restricted
to actions which are compositions of private announcements. So it follows from our work that all of
the reasoning in the Muddy Children can be carried out in a decidable system.
We should mention that the systems studied in [5, 6, 7] dier from ours in that they are variants
of dynamic logic rather than propositional logic. That is, announcements are particular types of
programs as opposed to modalities. This is a natural move, and although we have not followed it in
this paper, we have carried out a study of expressive power issues of various fragments of a dynamic
logic with announcement operators. We have shown, for example, that the dynamic logic formulations
are more expressive than the purely propositional ones. Details on this will appear in a forthcoming
paper.
Incidentally, the semantics in [5, 6, 7] use non-wellfounded sets. In other words, they work with
models modulo bisimulation. The advantages of moving from these to arbitrary Kripke models are
that the logic can be used by those who do not know about non-wellfounded sets, and also that
completeness results are slightly stronger with a more general semantics. The relevant equivalence of
the two semantics is the subject of the short note [11].
The following are the new contributions of this paper:
1. We formulated a logical system with modalities corresponding to intuitive group-level epistemic
actions. These actions include natural formalizations of announcements such as γ and , which
allow various types of suspicion by outsiders. Our apparatus also permits us to study epistemic
actions which apparently have not yet been considered in this line of work, such as actions in
which nothing actually happens but one agent suspects that a secret communication took place.
2. We formulated a logical system with these modalities and with common knowledge operators
for all groups. Building on the completeness of PDL and using a bit of term rewriting theory,
we axiomatized the validities in our system.
3. We obtained some results on expressive power: in the presence of common knowledge opera-
tors, it is not possible to translate away public announcements, and in our framework, private
announcements add expressive power to public ones.
8. Appendix: the lexicographic path order
In this appendix, we give the details on the lexicographic path ordering (LPO), both in general and in
connection with L([]) and L([];2).
Fix some many-sorted signature  of terms. In order to dene the LPO < on the -terms, we must
rst specify a well-order < on the set of function symbols of . The LPO determined by such choices
is the smallest relation < such that:
(LPO1) If (t1; : : : ; tn) < (s1; : : : ; sn) in the lexicographic ordering on n-tuples, and if tj < f(s1; : : : ; sn)
for 1  j  n, then f(t1; : : : ; tn) < f(s1; : : : ; sn).
(LPO2) If t  si for some i, then t < f(s1; : : : ; sn).
(LPO3) If g < f and ti < f(s1; : : : ; sn) for all i  m, then g(t1; : : : ; tm) < f(s1; : : : ; sn).
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Here is how this is applied in this paper. We shall take two sorts: sentences and actions. Our
signature contains the usual sentence-forming operators p (for p 2 AtSen) :, ^, and 2A for all A 2 A.
Here each p is 0-ary, : and 2A are unary, and ^ is binary. We also have an operator app taking
actions and sentences to sentences. We think of app( ; ) as merely a variation on [] . (The order
of arguments to app is signicant.) We further have a binary operator  on actions. (This is a
departure from the treatment of this paper, since we used  as a metalinguistic abbreviation instead
of as a formal symbol. It will be convenient to make this change because this leads to a smoother
treatment of the Composition Axiom.) Finally, for each nite Kripke frame K over L([]) and each
1  i  jKj, we have a symbol FiK taking jKj sentences and returning an action.
Each sentence ’ has a formal version ’ in this signature, and each action  also has a formal version
. These are dened by the recursion which is obvious except for the clauses
[]’ = app(’; )
 = FiK(pre(k1); : : : ;pre(kn))
Here  = hK; ki;prei with K = fk1; : : : ; kng in some specied order. However, outside of the proof
of Proposition 8.2 we shall not explicitly mention the formal versions at all, since they are harder to
read than the standard notation.
We must also rst x a wellfounded relation < on the function symbols. We set app to be greater
than all other function symbols. In all other cases, distinct function symbols are unordered.
Theorem 8.1 (Kamin and Levy [9]; Dershowitz [3]) Let < be an LPO on -terms.
1. < is transitive.
2. < has the subterm property: if t is a proper subterm of u, then t < u.
3. < is monotonic (it has the replacement property): if y < xi for some i, then
f(x1; : : : ; y; : : : xn) < f(x1; : : : ; xi; : : : xn):
4. < is wellfounded.
5. Consider a term rewriting system every rule of which of the form l ; r with r < l. Then the
system is terminating: there are no innite sequences of rewritings.
Proof Here is a sketch for part (1): We check by induction on the construction of the least relation
< that if s < t, then for all u such that t < u, s < u. For this, we use induction on the term u. We
omit the details. Further, (2) follows easily from (1) and (LPO2), and (3) from (LPO1), (1) and (2).
Moreover, (5) follows easily from (4) and (3), since the latter implies that any replacement according
to the rewrite system results in a smaller term in the order <.
Here is a proof of of the wellfoundedness property (4), taken from on Buchholz [2]. (We generalized
it slightly from the one-sorted to the many-sorted setting and from the assumption that < is a nite
linear order on  to the assumption that < is any wellfounded order.)
Let W be the set of terms t such that the order < is wellfounded below t. W is then itself
wellfounded under <. So for all n, Wn is wellfounded under the induced lexicographic order. We
prove by induction on the given wellfounded relation on function symbols of  that for all n-ary f ,
f [Wn]  W . So assume that for g < f , say with arity m, g[Wm]  W . We check this for f by
using induction on Wn. Fix ~s 2 Wn, and assume that whenever ~u < ~s in Wn, that f(~u) 2 W . We
prove that f(~s) 2 W by checking that for all t such that t < f(~s), t 2 W . And this is done by
induction on the structure of t. If t = f(~u) < f(~s) via (LPO1), then ~u < ~s lexicographically, and each
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ui < f(~s). This last point implies that ~u 2 Wn by induction hypothesis on t, so t 2 W by induction
hypothesis on Wn. If t  si so that t < f(~s) via (LPO2), then t 2 W by denition of W . And if
t = g(u1; : : : ; um) < f(~s) via (LPO3), then g < f and each ui < f(~s). By induction hypothesis on t,
each ui 2W . So by induction hypothesis on f , g(~u) 2W .
Now that we know that each f takes tuples in Wn to elements of W , it follows by induction on
terms that all terms belong to W . a
For more on the LPO, its generalizations and extensions, see the surveys Dershowitz [3] and
Plaisted [12].
Proposition 8.2 Consider the LPO < on L([];2) dened above.
1. If ! , then pre() < .
2. If ! , then [] < []2C .
3. pre()! p < []p.
4. pre()! :[] < []: .
5. [] ^ [] < []( ^ ).
6. pre()! Vf2A[] : !A g < []2A .
7. [  ]’ < [][] .
In particular, for all rules ’ ;  of the rewriting system R,  < ’.
Proof Part (1) holds because we regard  as a term  = FiK(γ1; : : : ; γn), for some frame K and i.
So whenever ! , each pre() is a proper subterm of .
Here is the argument for part (2): We need to see that app( ; ) < app(2C ; ). Now lexicograph-
ically, ( ; ) < (2C ; ). So we only need to know that  < app(2

C ; ). Let  = F
i
K(γ1; : : : ; γn).
Now according to equation (2.1) in Section 2.1,  is FjK(γ1; : : : ; γn), for the same K and γ1; : : : ; γn
but perhaps for j 6= i. Then it is clear by (LPO2) that γi < app(2C ; ) for all i. So by (LPO3),
 < app(2C ; ).
The remaining parts are similar. a
A normal form in a rewriting system is a sentence which cannot be rewritten in the system. Of course,
we are interested in the systems R and R from Sections 3 and 4, respectively. It follows from the
wellfoundedness of < that for every ’ there is a normal form nf(’)  ’ obtained by rewriting ’ in
some arbitrary fashion until a normal form is reached.
Lemma 8.3 A sentence ’ 2 L([]) is a normal form of R i ’ is a modal sentence (i.e., i ’
contains no actions). Moreover, the rule [][]’ ; [ ]’ is not needed to reduce ’ to normal form.
So for L([]), R has the same normal forms as R.
A sentence ’ 2 L([];2) is a normal form of R i ’ is built from atomic sentences using :, ^,
2A, and 2B, or if ’ is of the form []2

B , where  is a normal form action, and  is a normal
form. An action  is a normal form if whenever ! , then pre() is a normal form.
Proof It is immediate that every modal sentence is a normal form in L([]), that every []2C’ is a
normal form in L([];2), and that if each pre(), with ! , is a normal form, then  is a normal
form action. Going the other way, we check that if ’ 2 L([]), []’ is not a normal form. So we
see by an easy induction that the normal forms of L([]) are exactly the modal sentences. We also
argue by induction for L([];2), and we note that every [][]’ is not a normal form, using the rule
[][]’ ; [  ]’. a
One ne point concerning R and our work in Section 3 is that to reduce sentences of L([]) to
normal form we may restrict ourselves to rewriting sentences which are not subterms of actions. This
simplication accounts for the dierences between parallel results of Sections 3 and 4.
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